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This contribution offers an examination of the posi-
tions that have promoted a return to the ontology of 
objects and “realism” in philosophical thought (Meil-
lasoux, Shaviro, Morton, Harman, Gannon), and their 
consequences for theories of architecture. Frichot 
criticizes some collateral effects of such a theoreti-
cal shift in the field of architectural theory: in the 
first place, the risk of wanting to go back to objects, 
buildings, material effects with excessive ease. As an 
alternative, and even an antidote, she proposes to 
reconsider the notion of “ecology of practice” offered 
by Isabelle Stengers, meant as a continuous “process 
of learning” and an “act of creative resistance”. This 
alternative would be fundamentally critical (of the 
context of action, particularly for architects) and 
opposed to the “flat ontology” of “speculative real-
ists”. Ecology, for Stengers, is quite simply a question 
of habitat, the context in which you undertake your 
labour, and the habits that circumscribe your meth-
odologies. In operating within your “habitat” your 
practice must feel out its borders, recognises its limits, 
and also push against them, in order to re-establish 
them again and again.
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Prelude to a review of architectural thought-practices
On the 8th of September 2010 at 5.22pm I received 
an email from Anna Rubbo one of the founding edi-
tors of the “Australian journal Architectural Theory 
Review” (ATR). She was inviting me to join the edito-
rial committee. I know this date and time precisely 
because like a good archivist of the feminist thought-
practitioner in process I have kept a record of our 
email correspondence. I received Anna’s invitation 
with a sense of honour and great responsibility, and 
have since come to realise how crucial it is to make a 
claim for the specific disciplinary domain of architec-
tural theory, which is too often hidden away within 
architectural history programs, or added on as a 
supplementary appendage as an elective seminar in 
schools of architecture. Architectural theory is apt to 
stir up all manner of anxieties, as it has the capacity to 
disturb the status quo. Any institutional setting where 
architectural theory is not supported is one in which 
you can be sure dogmatic forces and mean-spirited 
fiefdoms have taken hold. ATR was founded in 1996 
by Anna with her colleague Adrian Snodgrass in 
the Faculty of Architecture, Design and Planning at 
the University of Sydney, Australia, at a significant 
distance away from the centres of architectural dis-
cursive power in Europe and America. In 2010 Anna 
was stepping down from her active role as editor to 
become an advisory member of the editorial commit-
tee, and a new generation was stepping up, with a 
group of three editors Naomi Stead, Lee Stickells and 
Michael Tawa being assigned the role of leading the 
journal into the future.
The editorial committee, as I discovered, supports 
the assigned editors in relation to the peer review of 
articles, prospective themes, budgetary issues and 
on going negotiations with Taylor and Francis, who 
have financed and published the journal since 2008. 
Right now, or at least while I have been composing 
this essay, ATR is in search of a new editorial team, a 
group of architectural researchers who can take up 
the baton and commit to the hard work of manag-
ing the publication of three issues a year. Since the 
journal emerged in the mid Nineties the whole land-
scape of the Australian university has substantially 
transformed, and the institution, once an intellectual 
refuge for the exploration of critical and creative 
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projects, could very well be mistaken for a neo-liberal 
corporate machine where questions of content and 
open collegial relations have given way to the quan-
tification of impact and research activity scores. The 
infamous H-Index, for instance, and the metrics by 
which a researcher is obliged to measure their output 
and impact in order to maintain their position or 
achieve a promotion. Now more than ever an intel-
lectually independent and critical zone of enquiry 
such as ATR is needed, where, as the current aims and 
scopes stipulate: «critical and even subversive read-
ings of what architectural theory has been, can be and 
will be» can be supported (ATR, 2016).
In 1996, within the very first issue of ATR, the editors 
stressed their wish to discuss diversity, regional-
ism, and a plurality of voices as a counter to threats 
of conformity in the face of globalisation and the 
information explosion, forces that have meanwhile 
overwhelmed us, taking their toll. By now the journal 
has come of age, and these threats have been felt and 
have exuded their material impact on our modes of 
thinking and doing. The founding editors responsible 
for the first thirteen years of the journal commenced 
their adventure by generously acknowledging that ar-
chitectural theory means different things to different 
people. By this they were neither supporting incom-
mensurable expressions of pluralism, nor extreme 
relativism. Instead they wanted to insist on their 
interest in the things that other people were thinking 
about in relation to the specifically described sites and 
problems of architecture. In the very first issue of the 
journal there were articles dedicated to Australian 
indigenous architecture, and the role of women in the 
discipline, setting out from the first moment a coun-
ter-hegemonic expression of other ways of engaging 
with architecture. 
I want to reframe the early ambitions of this im-
portant journal from the point of view of my cur-
rent reading of the philosopher of science Isabelle 
Stengers, and her arguments concerning an ecology 
of practices in the sciences. In this way I will be 
able to respond to the call enunciated by this newly 
emerging Italian journal of architectural theory 
called “Ardeth”. The call Ardeth makes concerns the 
relationship between subject-author vs the object-
project, and the irreducible relationship that appears 
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to chain them together in our discipline of architec-
ture, alongside assumptions about the unspeakable 
impenetrability of the object. The editors rightly state 
that this assumed relationship risks divorcing the 
architectural project from a social domain, and other 
sets of relations that might become independent from 
the progenitor of a given project. Another way this 
relationship can be characterised is as the enduring 
embrace between architectural icons and idols.
The problem that “Ardeth” frames is timely as much 
ado has been made about “objects” in theoretical and 
philosophical debates recently, specifically with re-
gard to the successful philosophical branding exercis-
es of so-called Object Oriented Ontology (OOO), and its 
association with what has come to be called “specula-
tive realism”. These theoretical tendencies challenge 
what they identify as the problematic “correlation” 
between subject and object. At first it might be tempt-
ing to believe that they share a common project with 
“Ardeth”, that is, a desire to challenge the relationship 
that binds subject to object, and vice versa, but this is 
not the case. I will explain my case below, but stress at 
once that I can only offer a preliminary argument in 
this essay. 
Speculative how? Speculative what?
Quentin Meillasoux, a proponent of speculative real-
ism, explains «correlationism consists in disqualify-
ing the claim that it is possible to consider the realms 
of subjectivity and objectivity independently of one 
another» (Meillasoux, 2010: 5). His project aims to 
conceive ways in which an object can be situated as 
“real” without having always to return to the subjec-
tive location of the thinker who has accommodated it 
by way of an intensional thought. What or where is 
this object that does not depend on a subject to think 
it? In philosophical terms, at least since Kant, it is 
called the “in itself”. It is that part of the object that 
persists in its stubborn reality irrespective of whether 
a subject bears some (intensional) relation to it or not. 
How can we (mere temporal and delimited subjects) 
make claims concerning the object’s existence? One of 
the problems in an age of global ecological disaster is 
that we have simply been too caught up about the “I” 
that thinks, which returns us too often to the anthro-
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subject who is allowed to think, and undertake the 
labour of thinking that is directed toward objects that 
are presumed to be outside, distinct, but at the same 
time within the thinker’s control. 
Steven Shaviro clearly and helpfully explains what 
is at stake for the diverse group of thinkers who fall 
under the rubric “speculative realism”. They share 
a commitment to metaphysical speculation (why is 
there something rather than nothing), and they hold 
to a robust ontological realism. This means, accord-
ing to Shaviro, that they move against the grain set by 
continental philosophy throughout the 20th century 
where metaphysics had been “phobically rejected” 
and an anti-realist stance had been considered de ri-
geur. Both of these claims, it needs to be said immedi-
ately, frame assumptions that need to be rigourously 
challenged because they do not hold in any consis-
tent way across the diverse philosophical projects 
and practices that are gathered under “continental 
philosophy”, for instance, “continental philosophy” 
is by no means consistently “idealist”. Nevertheless, 
this is how the argument has come to be habitu-
ally framed so that the bias that speculative realism 
purportedly challenges can be generally summed up 
with the kantian claim that «phenomena depend on 
the mind to exist» (Shaviro, 2014: 5). And it is with this 
that speculative realists want to disagree. Simply, they 
want to challenge the notion that a mind-independent 
reality does not exist. Of course the arguments of the 
protagonists become considerably more complicated, 
and they disagree with one another, and plot their 
own projects, and map their own trajectories into the 
pages of Wikipedia and the blogosphere, moving ever 
closer toward a “real” object that must, according to 
their own accounts, refuse them access.
Timothy Morton argues that «everything that has 
been called subject is only object, and what we have 
called intersubjectivity is interobjectivity, and all 
objects are unique, withdrawn inaccessible, we are 
even inaccessible to ourselves» (2016: 94). Graham 
Harman, a great inspiration for Morton, explains 
that objects must prevail because they are the basic 
building blocks of philosophy; they should neither be 
reduced to the effects of underlying forces composed 
of smaller and smaller components (undermined), nor 
should they be obscured by reference to their quali-
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ties and relations (overmined). This is the Goldilocks 
refrain at work in Harman’s theory, not too small, 
not to big, but just right: and that’s where the “real” 
object is to be found. The problem of critical thinking, 
Harman insists, is that it debunks objects and denies 
objects their autonomy, and so instead he argues for 
a naïve, phenomenological approach. All this talk 
of “objects” is especially compelling for architects 
as it seems to draw on common sense, asking us to 
respond innocently: well of course there are objects 
out there in the world independent of me (the human 
observer). I raise these two voices in particular, the 
first with a professorship in English (Morton) and the 
second a philosopher (Harman), because their work 
has been featured recently in the pages of influen-
tial journals of architecture, including the New York 
magazine “Log: Observations on Architecture and the 
Contemporary City” and the German architectural 
theory journal “Arch+”, thereby confirming the entry 
of their speculative concerns into our disciplinary 
domain (see Gannon, Harman, Ruy, Wiscombe, 2015; 
Morton, 2016). 
Object Oriented Ontology, a sub-set or else a sibling to 
“speculative realism”, through its evocative branding 
seems to promise the architect so much. The architect 
in response to its call wants to answer: «Yes, of course! 
I’ve had enough of all this talk of flow and process!» 
(Gannon et al., 2015: 73-74). I grapple with objects on 
a daily basis; lets get back to the thing-in-itself. What 
is architecture if not a complex object? This is the 
philosophical framework for me! 
Yet when you witness Harman speak, or read his 
essays and books, it becomes immediately clear that 
he is offering no great insight to the so-called object. 
Instead, the object remains withdrawn, without rela-
tions (it does not bear any relation to any other ob-
jects), it remains inaccessible to us (humans), and yet 
we humans are objects too (when we read Morton, at 
least). Harman goes so far as to claim that «relation-
ism has spread out like a virus and become horribly 
stale», making everything like everything else (Gan-
non et al., 2015: 75), and this is what a return to the 
discrete object must counter. Much of this argument 
rests on a gross simplification, in particular of the body 
of work developed by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari 
(amongst the straw figures set up by OOO), and the sub-
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text is clearly: we are tired of Deleuzianisms. We have 
exhausted Deleuze. Let’s move onto the next best thing: 
the object and its anti-relational and flat ontology.
The philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers points 
out that «Certainly the meditative question ‘what is 
a thing?’, or the evocation of the ‘thingness of things’ 
have an enticing philosophical flavour» (Stengers, 2014: 
190). The problem, which Stengers draws attention to, 
is that the meditative subject is a very specifically male, 
and unmarked subject, a pure locus that transcends 
what matters for us (191). Speculative realism notably 
emerges out of a gathering of self-convinced men of 
much the same generation (Shaviro, 2014; Gage, 2015: 
96). The list of associated thinkers that Shaviro enumer-
ates says it all: There is not a single woman amongst 
them, nor a member of any minority group. They are 
all white men mostly born in the late Sixties. That 
is to say, they represent an extremely narrow socio-
demographic strata of thinking subjects thinking about 
objects, and telling us how to think about objects too. 
There is a great deal more to be said about the emer-
gence of these tendencies in architecture, and how they 
can be read as symptoms of yet another retreat from 
social and political concerns; a retreat into the deeply 
conservative domain where phenomenology meets ar-
chitecture and waxes poetical over “real” objects about 
which little can finally be said. 
Stengers, whose essays have been included in at least 
two collections where the project of speculative real-
ism, including OOO is foregrounded, is both guarded 
and barbed in her critique of the work of specula-
tive realists (Stengers, 2014; 2011a). She obliquely 
remarks that the philosophers in question frame the 
problems that they deserve, or the problems that re-
quire them. What Stengers does is to create a pointed 
reversal whereby she questions the very problems 
these philosophers identify as interesting, suggesting 
that the philosophers in question have not so much 
defined the problem, but that the problem instead 
has defined them and their practices (2014: 192). The 
process of thinking and the subject who thinks, for 
the speculative realist, and the Object Oriented Ontol-
ogist, pertains to conservative definitions of thinking, 
and a staid understanding of a privileged humanist 
subject respectively. That is to say, thinking is articu-
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lated as a conservative practice, and not an expan-
sive one, and the subject who thinks, limited within 
their correlationist circle, is likewise a very staid and 
circumscribed subject whom the speculative realists 
take as their target: a straw man. In a recent essay, 
Cecilia Åberg, Kathrin Thiele and Iris van der Tuin 
point out that what has been overlooked by these 
popular “speculative” tendencies, which they want to 
question in a “friendly” way, is a long term feminist 
project wherein the formation of the masculinist, 
humanist subject has already been substantially chal-
lenged, and thinking and practicing as articulated by 
feminist materialists has already been re-established 
as an immanent engagement from within a situa-
tion as it unfolds. They claim, «we need to rethink 
everything, even thinking itself» (Åberg et al., 2015: 
152). How? By acknowledging, not further obviating, 
our embedded, embodied situation and context, by 
becoming even more orientated around objects as 
those things with which we co-habit amidst myriad 
latticeworks of relationality (and non relation too). 
They further argue that «Feminism can pride itself 
on a canon in which the speculative thought on the 
one hand, and the methodology of speculation on the 
other, are presented as intertwined» (156), and they 
go on to offer a series of examples to establish their 
point of view, drawing on such “thought-practitio-
ners” as Donna Haraway and Elizabeth Grosz, to 
demonstrate alternative genealogies to those traced 
out by the speculative realists and the Object Orient-
ed Ontologists.
A creative ecology of practice for architectural theory
This is where Stengers argument for an ecology 
of practices becomes valuable. She is necessarily 
wary, because she wants to acknowledge different 
styles of practices and their respective require-
ments and obligations in relation to their stipulated 
projects. This too is where I suggest Stenger’s call 
for a cosmopolitical project can be seen at work in 
the early ambitions of a journal project like Archi-
tectural Theory Review, which originally aimed to 
create a shared location where diverse ideas and 
practices could cluster and jostle alongside each 
other.
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What is this ecology of practices that Stengers for-
wards, and why might it be a valuable approach 
within the thinking and practice of architecture? Or 
better still, what can an ecology of practices do for 
you, in situ? «We do not know what a practice is able 
to become; what we know instead is that the very way 
we define, or address, a practice is part of the sur-
roundings which produces its ethos» (Stengers, 2005: 
195). The challenge of partaking in an ecology of prac-
tices depends on a «creative act of problematization» 
(Stengers, 2014: 193), and the problems you choose, or 
frame, and even invent, do not exist independently of 
you, but also determine your mode of practice and im-
pact upon your location or environment, the habitat 
in which you are undertaking your work. Ecology, for 
Stengers, is quite simply a question of habitat, the con-
text in which you undertake your labour, and the 
habits that circumscribe your methodologies. In oper-
ating within your “habitat” your practice must feel out 
its borders, recognise its limits, and also push against 
them, re-establish them again and again (Stengers, 
2005: 184). Crucially, these limits or borders should 
not only be used as a line of defence, but rather a 
generous threshold of exploration, a reaching out, an 
experimental groping. While habit enables practice in 
relation to habitat, habit must also be resisted where 
it begins to stultify thinking. The relevant tools for 
thinking, Stengers explains, are the ones that actualise 
and address the power of a situation. By power here, 
the idea of capacity, specifically the capacity of a prac-
titioner is raised. 
What can you do from amidst your situation, your 
practical “habitat”? What can you do that requires 
you to push beyond mere habit, even to establish new 
habits for thinking and practice? What does the situa-
tion demand of you, and how can you think with oth-
ers, with your affiliated practitioners? Furthermore, 
and again as pertaining to habits, an ecology of prac-
tices does something more than simply describe what 
you are already doing anyway. It pushes further, 
aiming to forge «new practical identities» (Stengers, 
2005: 186) for practices, new connections, new pos-
sibilities, and this very often requires an adventurous 
and speculative leap, but not of the kind that is stipu-
lated by the speculative realists. An adequate ecology 
of practices is not only adequate to a situation, or 
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a problematic field where it proposes a “solution”, 
it is a “learning process”, one that resists a present, 
especially where that present has become oppres-
sive (Stengers, 2011b: 407). That is to say, an ecology 
of practices is performed as an on-going struggle, as 
an act of creative resistance, pushing and pulling at 
constraints. Where speculative realism risks setting 
up, yet again, «its very own transcendence» (Åberg 
et al., 2015: 148), an ecology of practices responds 
immanently to what is at hand, to the context of 
practical action. This then re-orientates the subject 
in process in relation to the object in question in 
relation to the field of immanence upon which both 
are entangled, and upon which both perform. Similar 
challenges will no doubt face this new adventure 
upon which the journal “Ardeth” is launching forth, 
that is to say, a respect for diverse practices and theo-
ries, and a sensitivity to what is at stake for different 
thought-practices in light of their specific situations. 
The community of thought-practitioners in architec-
ture who still believe that explorative approaches to 
architectural theory as a specific discipline, with its 
requirements and obligations, has something to offer 
architecture will hopefully be able to benefit from 
this newly created forum.
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